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COMMENTS
THE "FORGOTTEN MAN" OF MECHANICS' LIEN
LAWS-THE HOMEOWNER
By GEORGE R. NocK*
OF ALL the law's victims, perhaps none is more deserving of sym-
pathy than the honest homeowner who is cheated of his property,
courtesy of the mechanics' lien laws. And let us not fail to shed a tear
for the lien claimant, whom the lien laws were designed to protect at
the homeowner's expense, and who, ironically, often finds that his
rights are illusory. It is the purpose of this comment to explore the
problems raised by this paradox and to evaluate some proposed solu-
tions. Special consideration will be given the proposal most frequently
and enthusiastically advanced-compulsory bonding of contractors on
private works. A suggested compulsory bonding statute drafted by a
committee of the California State Bar will be analyzed in detail.1
The California constitution gives "Mechanics, materialmen, arti-
sans, and laborers of every class ... a lien upon the property upon
which they 'have bestowed labor or furnished material for the value of
such labor done and material furnished ... -2The legislature has
extended lien rights to other classes of persons, including contractors
and subcontractors.3 At the same time, the legislature, recognizing
that lending institutions would finance construction -only if their loans
were secured by trust deeds which were preferred to other encum-
brances, has provided the money lenders with a reliable method of
insuring that their trust deeds will be preferred to mechanics' liens.4
Under present practices, federal home-loan guarantees have resulted
in construction loans being made for nearly the full value of the
completed structure.' The net result is that mechanics' liens are, in
perhaps the majority of instances, 6 junior to one or more trust deeds.
* Member, Second Year Class.
1 STATE BAR or CALwoRNIA, FiNrL REPORT OF Comm-rr TO SrtMY 1958 CoN-
FEENCE RESOLuTION No. 70, at 89-94 (dealing with mechanics' lien laws), Sept. 11,
1982 (unpublished report in University of California Law School Library, Berkeley)
[hereinafter cited as STATE BAR REPoRT].
2 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15.
8 CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1181. The list also includes "artisans, architects, registered
engineers, licensed land surveyors, builders, teamsters and draymen ... "
4 CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 1188.1. Under this section, the trust deed will be prior if
recorded before commencement of work.
5 SENATE JuDicxARY Comirr=T FoR INnmm, 1953-1955, ThmD PaoonEss REPoRT




After these deeds are foreclosed, there is little or nothing left for the
lien claimants. The homeowner faces an even more serious problem.
Mechanics' liens are not limited to the amount of the contract price
agreed upon by the owner and contractor for the construction work.
They are limited only by the reasonable value of the work done or
materials furnished by each claimant (although they cannot exceed
the amount of the contract price agreed upon by the claimant and
the person with whom he contracted). 7 Thus, the owner may pay the
contractor the full price of the structure and, if the contractor does not
pay his laborers, subcontractors, or materialmen (or his subcontractors
do not pay the persons with whom they have contracted) the owner
may find that the unpaid claimants have filed liens agatnst his prop-
erty. He must satisfy these claims out of his own pocket or suffer the
loss of his property upon foreclosure of the liens. The owner becomes
an involuntary guarantor that the contractor and those working under
him will fulfill their obligations to all those who have contributed to
the work of improvement. Recognizing this as unconscionable, the
legislature has provided the owner with a means of limiting his
aggregate liability to the contract price. If he requires the contractor
to procure a bond and records it, along with the contract, the court,
"where it would be equitable so to do," must restrict judgments on
liens in a foreclosure action to the amount which the owner owes the
contractor, and give judgment against the surety on the bond for the
difference between this amount and the amount of the lien claims.8
The bond must meet certain requirements-it must be given by "good
and sufficient sureties," must be for an amount not less than half the
contract price, and must inure to the benefit of those entitled to
mechanics' liens.9 It should be noted that the bond protects the owner
fully, even if it is insufficient in amount to cover all the claims of
lienors.10
The problem arises from the fact that the owner, in most cases,
does not take out such a bond, and therefore does not protect himself
from the risks of "double payment." He does not do so, because he is
usually totally unaware of the risks confronting him until it is too late.
7 CAL. CODE CrV. PRoc. § 1185.1(a).
8 If a proper bond has been filed and recorded, along with the contract, before
work has commenced, "the court must, where it would be equitable so to do, restrict
the recovery under such liens to an aggregate amount equal to the amount found to be
due from the owner to the contractor and render judgment against the contractor and
his sureties on said bond for any deficiency or difference there may remain between
said amount so found to be due to the contractor and the whole amount found to be due
to claimants for such labor or materials or both." CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1185.1(c).
9 CAL. CODE CnV. PRoc. § 1185.1(c).
10 The statute specifically declares a legislative intent to enable the owner to limit
his liability to the amount of the contract price, by procuring a proper bond. CAL. CoDE
Cxv. PRoc. § 1185.1(d).
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Many, if not most, homeowners have never heard of mechanics' liens.
Very few know about the double payment problem and how to protect
themselves from it. Most of those who do know are talked out of their
right to require' the contractor to procure a bond, either by the con-
tractor or by some "disinterested" third party, such as a money lender,
who, acting at the contractor's instance, advises against requiring a
bond.1 Suspecting nothing, the homeowner does not bother to secure
the advice of counsel. If the contractor fails before satisfying his debts
incurred on the project, the homeowner may lose his entire interest in
the property which was to have been his "dream house." The life
savings of an unsuspecting homeowner may ultimately turn up on the
list of liabilities in the contractor's bankruptcy petition.
NATURE OF COMPULSORY BONDING PLANS
The gravity of the difficulties confronting claimants and home-
owners has begotten almost as many proposed solutions as there are
persons concerned about the problem. Perhaps the one most fre-
quently advanced is a statutory requirement-aimed at protecting both
.lienors and owners-that contractors must, on all or some private jobs,
file a bond meeting the present statutory requirements. 2 Such a
statute would, wherever it was applied, protect the homeowner by
insuring that his liability would be limited to the contract price. It
would protect the lien claimants by giving them a right of action
against the surety on the bond in case they were not paid, in addition
to the uncertain lien rights which they now enjoy. Such a bond is now
required on all construction contracts (exceeding 2,500 dollars) let
by the State of California.'3
Compulsory bonding plans (with one exception to be discussed
later) would not alter existing mechanics' liens statutes, but would
merely supplement them. However, they would, where applicable,
render mechanics' liens obsolete by providing a simpler and more
effective remedy.
Since not all contracts should be required to be accompanied by a
bond-the practical difficulties of securing and recording a bond for
the installation of a stove would be enormous in relation to the
amounts involved-the question arises as to which contracts should be
1lIt has been asserted that when a contractor hears that an owner is thinking
about requiring a bond, he makes it clear to the lender that the latter should advise the
owner against the bond. The lender, wishing to retain the contractor's business, assures
the owner that the contractor is reliable and a bond unnecessary. TnMD Pnocamss RE-
PORT 88.
12 At present, the bond is optional with the owner. CAL. CODE Civ. P.Roc. § 1185.1.
3 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 4200-08.
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exempt. One proposal, 4 which may be called the "comprehensive
plan," would require the bond if the contract exceeded some small
amount, such as 1,00011 or 2,500 dollars. Another proposal, which may
be referred to as the 'limited plan," would require only contracts ex-
ceeding a much larger sum to be accompanied by a bond.
The latter approach was taken by the State Bar of California in a
suggested statute which it drafted."8 That statute, hereinafter referred
to as State Bar Statute,' would require all licensed contractors to
furnish the owner a corporate surety bond in the amount of the con-
tract price where the total value of the work to be done exceeded 25,000
dollars. The bond would be a faithful performance and labor and
material bond (i.e., it would guarantee to the owner that the contrac-
tor would faithfully perform his contract, and to the lienors that they
would be paid if the contractor defaulted), and at least fifty per cent
of it would have to inure to the benefit of potential lienors. A new
bond, or a rider to the original one, would have to be obtained if
the contract price were increased ten per cent or more by change
orders. In lieu of the corporate surety bond, the contractor could
furnish a bond executed by two personal suieties, provided they quali-
fied before the Contractors' State License Board. In order to qualify,
each surety would have to be a California resident and householder
and have a net worth, apart from property exempt from execution, of
the amount of the bond.'8 A copy of the bond would have to be mailed
to the Board; failure to mail it would extend the limitation period for
suits on the bond, which is normally six months, to two years, and
would be grounds for disciplinary action against the contractor by
the Board.' 9 The Board would then make copies of the bond available
on request to beneficiaries of the bond. It would not be necessary to
file a mechanics' lien before suing on the bond unless the surety had
requested the claimant ,to do so, in writing, and in time for the
claimant to comply with the statutory requirements for filing. The
14 This proposal does not appear to have been put forward in precisely the form
in which it is discussed herein. This form is convenient for discussion, since it combines
the common features of several similar proposals.
15 The amount formerly used in CAL. Gov'r CODE § 4200.
16 STATE BAa REPoRT 89-94.
17 The title given in the STATE BAm REPORT is "Specimen Compulsory Bonding
Law Private Works."
18 STATE: BAR REPORT 90.
19 This is the only provision made in the State Bar Statute for sanctions for non-
compliance, and the context leaves it unclear whether failure to furnish the bond, or
merely to mail the bond, is to be grounds for disciplinary action. Unless the sanctions
for noncompliance were dearly stated, the statute would be ineffectual.
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statute would apply to all contracts between an owner and a prime
contractor 20 for private construction or alteration work.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPULSORY BONDING
Before attempting an evaluation of these proposals, it might be
wise to consider whether compulsory bonding would be constitutional.
The question is not altogether clear, the California Supreme Court
having ruled both ways, depending on the nature of the statute before
it.2 No statute like those contemplated has ever been considered by
that court.
The constitutionality of mandatory bonding statutes has a checkered
history. It was originally settled law22 that, notwithstanding the word-
ing of the constitution,23 mechanics' liens were restricted to the amount
of the contract price-that is, the amount found due and owing from
the owner to the contractor at the time the liens were filed. An attempt
by the legislature to remove this limitation was declared invalid.24
Then in 1885 the legislature provided25 that contracts which did not
follow a prescribed form, designed to protect lienors, were void, and
left the property subject to unlimited mechanics' liens. The constitu-
tionality of this provision was apparently never questioned, but it
"did not work well in practical operation"26 because the complexities
of the required contract provisions gave rise to frequent disputes as to
whether the statutory requirements had been met. A later statute
7
providing for a compulsory bond in the amount of twenty-five per
cent of the contract price was held unconstitutional in Gibbs v. Tally.
28
The effect of noncompliance with this statute was to render the owner
personally liable in damages to persons injured as a result of failure to
file a valid bond. The chief grounds for holding the statute unconstitu-
tional were that it sought to make the owner liable for a debt he did
not owe and that it violated the constitutional guarantees of the right
of "acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,"29 including the
right of freedom to contract respecting that property. The court also
2 0 It is unclear from the wording whether the statute would apply in the case of an
owner who uses segregated contractors and supervises the work himself.
21Roystone Co. v. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, 154 Pac. 15 (1915) (constitutional);
Gibbs v. Tally, 133 Cal. 373, 65 Pac. 970 (1901) (unconstitutional).
22 Renton v. Conley, 49 Cal. 185 (1874).
23 The liens are given "for the value of such labor done and material fur-
nished .... ." CAL. CoNsT. art. XX, § 15.
24 Latson v. Nelson, 11 PAc. C.L.J. 589, 2 Cal. Unrep. 199 (1883).
25 Cal. Stat. 1885, ch. 152, § 1, at ,143.
2 6 Roystone Co. v. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, 533, 154 Pac. 15, 18 (1915).
27 Cal. Stat. 1893, ch. 171, § 1, at 202.
28 133 Cal. 373, 65 Pac. 970 (1901).
29 CA.. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
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asserted that the statute was a violation of due process, under the
federal constitution.30
In 1911 the legislature hit upon a successful and constitutionally
acceptable method of protecting lienors, while at the same time per-
mitting the owner to limit his liability to the contract price. The provi-
sion,3' which remains the law today,- removed the limitation of lien
liability, but permitted the owner to restore it by procuring, or causing
to be procured, the requisite bond. This was sustained as constitu-
tional in the leading case of Roystone Co. v. Darling. The court, in
sustaining the statute, declined to express an opinion as to whether it
would be- constitutional to require a bond to be taken out other than
as a condition of limiting the owner's lien liability.
No flat prediction as -to the constitutionality of compulsory bond-
Mgin statutes can safely be made. The question would be much clearer
had the court in Roystone Co. seen fit to overrule Gibbs, but it did
not do so. An educated guess, however, can be hazarded. The constitu-
tionality of a compulsory bonding law would probably depend on the
nature of the sanctions imposed for noncompliance. If the statute
sought to impose personal (as opposed to lien) liability on the owner
if no bond were filed, it would be unconstitutional under the holding
in Gibbs. If, however, the contractor alone were to pay the penalty
(such as revocation or suspension of his license) for failure to procure
a bond, the statute would probably be justified as a reasonable regula-
tion of the contracting business, comparable to the license bonds re-
quired to be posted by the holders of certain occupations, including
some contractors.3 4
The argument that compulsory bonding statutes would restrict the
owner's freedom of contract by requiring him to absorb all or part of
the cost of the bond premium, whatever its merit, would probably
not be sympathetically received by the courts. This is because it would
likely be raised by a party adverse to the owner, such as a contractor,
80 Doubt was cast upon the validity of this assertion by a dictum in Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co. v. N. 0. Nelson Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 352, 359 (1934), and it was flatly
contradicted in Hollenbeck-Bush Planing Mill Co. v. Amweg, 177 Cal. 159, 170 Pac.
148 (1917).
31 Cal. Stat. 1911, ch. 681, § 1, at 1313.
32 CAL. CODE Civ. NoC. § 1185.1.
S 171 Cal. 526, 154 Pac. 15 (1915). The case gives a thorough history of the
problem.
84 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7071.5 requires a bond of $3,000 to $,10,000 as
a condition precedent to the issuance or reissuance of a contractor's license to anyone
against whom disciplinary action has ever been taken. Section 7071.9 requires a bond
of $1,000 as a prerequisite to the issuance or renewal of a license in all cases. These
bonds are for the benefit of lienors and others who may be damaged by the con-
tractor's professional misbehavior.
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or a surety trying to avoid a bond the surety had written on the
ground that the statute requiring it was unconstitutional.85
THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEMS
Other objections to compulsory bonding must be sought outside
the constitution. Before considering them, it would be helpful to try
to determine the extent of the problems. If these problems are theo-
retical only, no statutory solution may be necessary. It will be con-
venient to place those who suffer under the present mechanics' liens
scheme into three general categories: laborers, other lien claimants
(chiefly including materialmen and subcontractors, but not contrac-
tors), and homeowners. The extent of the problems confronting each
category-and the need for their solution-will be considered separately.
Laborers
Laborers are presently afforded numerous protections outside of
the lien laws. In California they are commonly represented by unions.
There are laws which require that they be paid at least twice a month;
failure to pay wages on time subjects the employer to civil penalties.3 6
They are also given preference over the general creditors of their
employers in case of the employer's insolvency, or when such a creditor
seeks to garnish or attach the employer's assets.31 Their unions normally
require them to stop work on a job if a payday is missed or a paycheck
bounces.3 8 Finally, they are permitted to assign their wage claims to
the State Division of Labor Law Enforcement, which prosecutes them
vigorously, acting as a sort of collection attorney for the employee;
without fee.3 9 The Labor Commissioner is even permitted to take
assignments of unperfected mechanics' liens,40 even though the in-
choate right to file such liens is not otherwise assignable.41 In spite of
all this protection, some wage losses on the part of construction workers
do occur. Precise figures are not presently available,4 but William E.
Fleck, Supervising Deputy Labor Commissioner, estimates that losses
on verified wage claims are thirty per cent on private construction jobs
35 See also -Shaughnessy v. American Sur. Co., 138 Cal. 543, 69 Pac. 250, aff'd
on rehearing, 71 Pac. 701 (1903), which held that a bond given pursuant to an un-
constitutional mandatory-bonding statute was void as a statutory bond and was not
good as a common law bond.
86 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 204, 207, 210.
37 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1204, 1206.
3 8 Confidential Telephone Interview With Labor Union Official in San Francisco,
Aug. 18, 1964.
89 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 96-99.
40 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 96, 97.
41 Mills v. La Verne Land Co., 97 Cal. 254, 32 Pac. 169 (1893).
42 The Division of Labor Law Enforcement is now compiling such figures. Inter-
view With Mr. William E. Flec, Supervising Deputy Labor Commissioner, in San
Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
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(as opposed to about five per cent in public construction work, which
is bonded). 43 Still, the dollar volume of such losses could not be too
great, as the total wage losses in all jobs, not merely those involving
private construction, scarcely exceeded 500,000 dollars in fiscal 1963-
1964." Since most construction wage losses can be attributed either
to failure on the part of employees to present their claims in time to
file mechanics' liens, or to priorities of trust deeds over liens duly filed,45
the problem could be largely alleviated by compulsory bonding. How-
ever, although the extent of the problem confronting laborers is un-
certain, it is probably so small as not to warrant a solution that would
impose serious hardships on others. This is especially true in light of
the fact that few laborers actually sustain serious losses; a laborer who
continues to work after his wages are in default has only himself to
blame for further losses.
Subcontractors and Materialmen
Subcontractors and materialmen, on the other hand, are given no
statutory protection apart from the mechanics' lien laws. Are they
entitled to any additional protection? It is submitted that they are not.
They are businessmen, and presumably able to take care of themselves.
Unlike laborers, they can reasonably be expected to take the trouble
to consult a lawyer or otherwise acquaint themselves with the laws
relating to their particular businesses. They can be expected, before
extending credit, to determine whether any liens they might file will
be junior to other encumbrances-such information may be obtained
by examinations of the public records and of the jobsite, which will tell
him whether work has been commenced.46 If a subcontractor or mate-
rialman is not satisfied with a contractor's signature and does not find
sufficient security in the lien laws, he should demand additional secu-
rity; if he does not get it, 'he should refuse to enter into a contract.
Such a refusal of business demands a certain amount of courage, but
no more than is required of businessmen outside the construction in-
dustry, who are given no statutory security. No entirely convincing
reason has been advanced for even the present preferred status of sub-
contractors and materialmen relative to other classes of businessmen.47
43 This estimate is confined to claims made to the Division of Labor Law Enforce-
ment. Interview With Mr. William E. Fleck, Supervising Deputy Labor Commissioner,
in San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
44 Figures obtained from the files of the Division of Labor Law Enforcement, San
Francisco.
45 nterview With Mr. William E. Fleck, Supervising Deputy Labor Commissioner,
in San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
46 Only encumbrances which are recorded or of which the lienor has actual knowl-
edge before work has been commenced will be preferred to mechanics' liens. CAL. CoDE
CIv. PROC. § 1188.1.
47This assertion will be supported at length infra.
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Therefore, there seems no sound reason for affording them additional
protection, except as an incidental consequence of measures aimed at
alleviating the problems of those who have a respectable claim to
greater protection.
Owners
The homeowner, however, is in an entirely different position; he
can suffer grave financial losses as the result of another's dishonesty
or financial irresponsibility without being at all aware of the risks he
fdces. He is accustomed to purchasing personalty on credit, and real-
izes that his automobile or television set can be repossessed only if he
should breach his installment sales contract. He has no reason to be-
lieve that he can lose his entire interest in his land and the house he
is building even though he complies strictly with every fine-print term
of his construction contract. It is true that he has available adequate
legal means to protect himself, but it is equally true that he does not
utilize these means.4 He is blissfully unaware of the problem, and his
contractor, reluctant to take out a bond, will not enlighten him. He
could, of course, protect himself if he took the trouble to consult a
competent attorney before letting the contract, but the fact is that
very few people think of seeing a lawyer until they are in trouble. The
easiest thing to do would be to shrug the matter off with the observa-
tion that anyone who makes large investments without consulting a
lawyer deserves whatever he gets; but this is a rather harsh attitude.
The homeowner is also entitled to special consideration from the
legislature because he alone, among those affected by legislation in the
field of mechanics' liens, is not organized, and thus not represented by
lobbyists in Sacramento.4"
Unanswered is the question of how frequent and how extensive are
the homeowner's losses. There is little evidence on the point. Appar-
ently, the problem first received public attention in the early 1950's,
when a number of swimming-pool contractors failed, leaving over 300
owners in Los Angeles County alone with liens on their property,
amounting to as much as 250 per cent of the contract price on each
pool. 50 The Los Angeles County Grand Jury viewed the situation with
considerable alarm, and recommended legislative action along certain
lines5 ' (not, incidentally, including compulsory bonding). Apparently,
48 This observation has been made by numerous persons. See, e.g., Thm PRoGnSs
REPoR-T 76; STATE BAR LEPoRT 77.
49 By contrast, more than forty representatives of contractors, subcontractors, and
materialmen attended hearings on one mechanics' lien measure. S=ATE JuDIciaRy
ComMTrE FoR ILNTRI, 1957-1959, FIFTH lPROGEss REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE
19-20 [hereinafter cited as FiTH PoGEss REPoRTI.
5 0 FIFTH PROGRSS REPORT 80.
51 Id. at 74. It was recommended that lenders be required to treat loan proceeds as
a trust fund and that lienors be required to give the lender and builder copies of their
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no such widespread losses have occurred since, and such losses as have
occurred do not seem to have received public attention. There are some
estimates, by interested individuals, indicating that losses are small and
infrequent.2 Statistics on the number and dollar value of mechanics'
liens filed 3 are not helpful, as there is no way of determining how
many are filed by contractors themselves when the owner defaults, and
how many of those not filed by the contractor are satisfied by the
contractor at no cost to the owner." Figures compiled by the Contrac-
tors' State License Board concerning the number and kind of verified
statutory violations by contractors are more helpful. In fiscal 1963-1964,
there were 69 cases of abandonment of projects,55 23 cases of diversion
of funds (which is most likely to result in loss to the owner), 56 84
cases involving withholding of funds (owed to potential lienors) by
the contractor,17 and 227 cases of bankruptcy. 8 But fur myriad rea-
sons,159 even these figures are far from conclusive in determining the
invoices within ten days after performance of labor or sale of materials, noting on the
invoices that if they were unpaid after thirty days, mechanics' liens would be filed. It
was also recommended that lenders be required to retain at least twenty per cent of
the loan funds until expiration of the period for the filing of liens.
52 These estimates are usually made by persons who would suffer some loss or
inconvenience if a compulsory bonding statute or some other solution were enacted.
In FnITH PRoGRESs REPORT 108, it was said that on only about one occasion in three
months (in Santa Clara County) is a homeowner required to pay more than the con-
tract price. A representative of materialmen asserted that members of his association
file lien claims on only about one out of every 200 jobs on which they furnish ma-
terials. Id. at 36. Double payment was asserted to be a "bad situation," but "not suf-
ficiently widespread" to warrant measures which would substantially increase construc-
tion costs. TmRD PROGRESS REPORT 107.
53 E.g., in 1953, 5,796 mechanics' liens, totalling $4,443,000, were filed in Los
Angeles County. Tnwu PRoGnEss REPORT 103.
54 The contractor is not only personally liable for the claims of those with whom he
has contracted, but must defend at his own expense any action brought to foreclose a
lien, apparently including liens filed by persons with whom the contractor was not in
privity, such as the materialman of a subcontractor. Amounts recovered on lien claims
may be deducted by the owner from payments due the contractor. CAL. CODE CIV.
PRoC. § 1186.1. However, if the owner has settled with the contractor in full, he can
recover from the contractor only the amount of lien claims "for which the contractor
was originally the party liable." This section does not appear to have been construed,
so it is unclear whether the owner could recover on claims, which he had satis-
fied, filed by persons with whom the contractor had no privity.
55 Violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7107.
56 Violation of CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 7108.
57 Violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7120.
58 Violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7113.5. The term "bankruptcy" is used
generically. The section also forbids any other settlement of claims with creditors gen-
erally for less than their fuill value.
59 E.g., a contractor may abandon a project before being paid; funds diverted or
withheld may be restored by the contractor after complaint to the Board is made;
creditors of a bankrupt contractor may not file timely claims of lien; the same con-
tractor is often found in violation of several statutes on the same job.
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number of losses by homeowners, and not at all helpful in determining
the amount of such losses. The result is that until adequate public
records are available, it will be impossible to determine the frequency
and amount of homeowners' losses.
The overall conclusion is that all three classes have problems, and
those of the ,homeowner cry out most strongly for solution. But the
extent of these problems is presently unknown; it may be very great,
or very small. This should be borne in mind in evaluating the proposals
for compulsory bonding.
EFFECT OF COMPULSORY BONDING
"Comprehensive Plan"
What would be the effect of a compulsory bonding statute? Let us
consider first the "comprehensive plan" (applicable to contracts ex-
ceeding 1,000 or 2,500 dollars) .0 By affording the lien claimant a right
of action against a financially responsible surety and insuring that the
homeowner would 'have to pay for his property once only, such a
statute would obviously solve the most serious problems. It would not
afford protection on jobs involving small sums, but losses on such jobs
would likely be small.' Since revocation or suspension of license is
the most appropriate sanction for noncompliance, the statute would
apply only to licensed contractors, who represent an unknown per-
centage of all contractors.2 The enforcement problems are not to be
underestimated.6 3 There would be some minor beneficial effects.
64
60 These are the amounts formerly and presently used in connection with compulsory
bonding in public works contracts. CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 4200.
'1 Because some swimming pools are advertised for less than $2,500, swimming
pool contractors would not be covered by a bonding statute unless the $1,000 limita-
tion were used. Since swimming pool contractors have, by one instance of mass failure,
shown themselves to be questionable risks, it would seem wise to cover them. See nofe
50 supra and accompanying text.
6 2 It has been estimated that only twenty-five per cent of the contractors in Orange
County are licensed. Tumi PRooREss REPORT 78. Since it is a misdemeanor to act as a
contractor without a license, CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CoDE § 7028, this estimate, if accurate,
indicates that enforcement of this section may be somewhat lax.
SAt present, the Contractors' State License Board apparently enforces the law
only in response to complaints of violation. Any action which poses a threat to lienors
or owners is already grounds for disciplinary action, and this type of enforcement has
not been effective in solving the problem. It would seem, therefore, that the effective-
ness of a bonding statute would depend on tighter enforcement procedures. Adequate
enforcement would require an agent of the Board to examine every building permit
issued in the State and determine, if a bond were required for the particular contract,
whether the contractor was in fact bonded (and licensed). The legislature should con-
sider what additional appropriations the Board would need in order to carry out this
task.
4For instance, the contractor would have the benefit of the surety's expert advice,
and might thus avoid jobs he is not prepared to handle.
[Vol. 16
November, 1964]
Unfortunately such legislation would not be without its negative
effects. These effects might be very minor-or they might be quite
injurious, not only to the construction industry, but to the entire econo-
my of the State. The consequences are largely unpredictable; they
would depend primarily on the behavior of the surety industry in
response to the legislation.
One of the arguments in favor of compulsory bonding is that it
would have a salutary effect on the construction industry by elimina-
ting those contractors who are dishonest, incompetent, insolvent, and
therefore unbondable. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that
such contractors would be the only ones put out of business. Bonding
companies risk enormous losses on each bond in relation to the very
small premium they receive.6 5 Consequently, they are forced to im-
pose extremely high standards on those seeking to bond themselves.
To secure a corporate surety bond, a contractor must show himself
to be experienced, thoroughly honest, and competent. In addition, he
must exhibit a high degree of financial responsibility.6 The result is
that many honest, competent, and solvent contractors, while presenting
a very slight risk that they will not be able to undertake successfully a
given job, nonetheless present a risk greater than the sureties are
willing to accept-the premium is simply not worth it. It has been
estimated that as many as 30,000 of the 38,73567 licensed general con-
tractors could not get bonds."8 There is no reason to believe that more
than a small fraction of these unbondable contractors present a clear
and present danger of inflicting losses on homeowners or lien claimants.
The "comprehensive plan" could result in their being forced out of
business, or into subcontracting or small alteration jobs. But the con-
sequences would not necessarily stop there. Most of the small, un-
bondable contractors probably specialize in homebuilding. Their sud-
den elimination could result in a severe shortage of contractors willing
and able to build individual homes. If the larger, bondable contractors,
who tend to specialize in heavier types of construction, were reluctant,
because of lack of experience in home construction, to fill this gap, the
result could be a temporary dislocation of the economy. This economic
dislocation would be the result of a severe dip in housing starts, with
65 Most bonds are actually faithful performance bonds, to which a labor and ma-
terial bond is appended at no extra cost. The cost of such a bond is normally one per
cent of the contract price on the first $100,000, with some diminution in the rate as
the size of the bond increases. Interview With Mr. Lee Cutler of Marsh and McLennan,
Brokers, in San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
66 Interview With Mr. Byrne E. Davis of Marsh and McLennan, Brokers, in San
Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
6 7 Figure (for fiscal 1963-1964) obtained from the files of the Contractors' State
License Board, San Francisco.
68 Interview With Mr. Byrne E. Davis of Marsh and McLennan, Brokers, in San
Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
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consequent unemployment and business failures not only among con-
tractors, but also among subcontractors, materialmen, and the workers
employed by all of them. And the homeowner would not get his house
built, for want of someone to build it. Since experience normally is
required of a contractor before he can get a corporate surety bond, the
contracting field would be closed to new entrants-except for well-
capitalized corporations, and individuals with wealthy friends or rela-
tives, who would be willing to write personal surety bonds to give a
young man his start.
If the events discussed above were to occur, the political repercus-
sions would almost certainly lead to remedial legislation. For instance,
the legislature might create a state bonding agency, which would bond
most of the otherwise unbondable contractors. Assuming that the sure-
ties are right in their refusal to bond most contractors, such an agency
would either have to charge outsize premiums, thus adding materially
to construction costs, or operate at a deficit, which would be made up
out of general revenues. We would then be treated to the spectacle
of taxpayers subsidizing contractors.
Of course, the above might not happen at all. The sureties, in
response to the pressures on them to bond small contractors, might
well re-evaluate their bonding requirements and liberalize them suffi-
ciently to accommodate small, honest, and competent contractors. Or
they might develop an assigned-risk plan.6 9 Of course, if they did these
things contrary to sound actuarial practice, they might go bankrupt
themselves. And any legislation tending to promote bankruptcies
among surety companies hardly promotes business stability. It is even
barely possible that the sureties might develop a plan, similar to that
used among casualty insurers, regulating their premium rates accord-
ing to the risk potential of the individual contractor. But any resultant
increase in premium rates would probably be borne, in whole or in
part, by the homeowner.
In sum, the social and economic consequences of comprehensive
compulsory bonding legislation are unpredictable-they may be very
great, or very small. There is no good reason to believe that they would
not be serious. At the same time the extent of the problem sought to be
solved is largely uncertain. Consequently, comprehensive compulsory
bonding legislation could have the effect of alleviating a very great
problem at very small social cost-or of alleviating a very minor prob-
lem at very great cost. It is submitted that the risk is too great to take.
Such legislation cannot be recommended at least until such time as
69 Under an assigned risk plan, each surety would bond an allotted portion of the
poor risks among the contractors, perhaps at higher rates. The system works in auto-
mobile liability insurance, but the sureties insist it would not be applicable to con-
tractors' bonds. Confidential Telephone Interview With an Executive of a Large Surety
Company, in San Francisco, Aug. 23, 1964.
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the extent of the problem can be measured with some precision, and
proves to be acute.
State Bar Statute
The dangers outlined above were no doubt recognized by the
framers of the State Bar Statute, which would apply only to contracts
exceeding 25,000 dollars. This limitation removes many of the objec-
tions to compulsory bonding-and effectively emasculates the statute.
The proposal would have only very minor negative social consequences
at most. Some deserving small contractors would be unable to graduate
to larger jobs;70 a few contractors would be forced out of business. But
the statute would not solve the problem to any real extent, as it would
not offer protection to those who need it most. It would not effectively
protect laborers, as wage losses occur predominantly on small jobs.7'
It would not protect the ordinary homeowner, as most homes still cost
less than 25,000 dollars to build, exclusive of land.72 It would protect
the owner of a relatively expensive home, although he is more likely to
be in the habit of seeking the advice of counsel before making large
investments, and would thus be able to protect himself.
The State Bar Statute, as written, is reported as "acceptable" to
the surety industry. It is not difficult to see why. Most large con-
struction contracts are accompanied by bonds, as the large corpora-
tions and wealthy individuals who let them are aware of the law and
take the proper steps to protect themselves. But many are not.74 If the
contractor is a large construction firm with unquestioned credit, the
owner may regard the bond as unnecessary and elect to spare himself
70If a contractor normally constructed homes costing less than $25,000, and then
sought a bond on a larger job, the surety would be more reluctant to bond him than
if it had received bond premiums from the smaller jobs and had been able to observe
the contractor's performance on them. Interview With Mr. Byrne E. Davis of Marsh
and McLennan, Brokers, in San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
7 1 Interview With Mr. William E. Fleck, Supervising Deputy Labor Commissioner,
in San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
72 For the nation as a whole, the average construction cost of new one-family hous-
ing units started in 1963 was $14,975. STATaSTicAL ABSTAcT OF = UNranm STATEs
751 (1964). Similar figures are apparently unavailable for California. Statistics in the
file of the San Francisco Central Permit Bureau indicate that the San Francisco figure
slightly exceeds $25,000. One report on construction costs in the San Francisco Bay
Area gives the cost of a hypothetical "Medium Dwelling" as $14,917, and that of a
"Good Dwelling" as $26,487 (not including the value of the lot). BAY Arm& REAL
EsTATE Rrn'oRT 22, 24. (Copyright 1964).
73 STATz BAnl REPORT 87.
74
It is apparently customary, in the case of major private construction, to require
bonds if the contract is let by competitive bidding, but to dispense with the bond if
the contract is negotiated, and the contractor's credit is satisfactory to the owner. Inter-
view With Mr. Byrne E. Davis of Marsh and McLennan, Brokers, in San Francisco,
Aug. 19, 1964.
November, 1964] COMMENTS
the cost of the premium, which may be substantial.75 At all events, the
owner is able to make a rational choice. The State Bar Statute would
deprive him of this choice. It would enrich the sureties by permitting
them to receive large premiums for writing virtually risk-free bonds
on all major jobs, while putting no pressure on them to write small,
risky bonds. If some group is to be selected to receive what amounts
to a royalty on major construction projects, another group might be
considered more deserving-law students, perhaps.
In short, the State Bar Statute is a half-measure, at best. It would
do some little good and perhaps cause some little harm. But it should
not be enacted. If the legislature were to adopt it on the assumption
that it would solve the problems of lienors and homeowners, any
meaningful legislation on the problem would be precluded until the
erroneous nature of that assumption were brought home to the legisla-
ture by another major scandal.""
PLANS REQUIRING ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AGENCIES
If compulsory bonding is not the answer, what is? Here are some
of the proposals which have come to the writer's attention.
A recent law review comment" put forth a proposal for the
elimination of the present mechanics' liens statutes, substituting a
system of contractors' liens and mandatory bonding on all contracts
exceeding 1,000 dollars, with a right in materialmen, subcontractors,
and laborers to bring a derivative action on the contractor's lien on
smaller jobs. This proposal is well thought out, and its authors make
out a very good case for it. Unfortunately, it is open to the same ob-
jection as the other comprehensive compulsory bonding plan-it may
alleviate a minor problem at great social cost.78
Consideration has been given to the possibility of declaring money
paid to the contractor to be a trust fund for the benefit of other persons
entitled to liens which the contractor could divert to other uses only
on pain of severe criminal sanctions.7 Aside from questions of the
effectiveness of possible conviction of felony as a deterrent to misuse
of funds,80 the chief objection to such a plan is that it would almost
certainly be unconstitutional.81
75For example, on a $2,500,000 contract, the premium would be approximately
$15,000.
76A repetition of the Los Angeles swimming pool scandal, for example, would not
be prevented by enactment of the State Bar Statute. Nearly all swimming pool con-
tracts are for less than $25,000, and would therefore not be covered by the statute.
77 51 CALIF. L. REv. 331, 364-83 (1963).
78 Any comprehensive compulsory bonding plan could lead to the negative social
consequences discussed above, since it would prevent unbondable contractors from
operating, at least as general contractors.
7 9 F= - PRormss REPORT 79.
80 Misuse of funds is already grounds for disciplinary action, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CoDE § 7108, yet the problem remains.
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The answer has been thought to lie in tighter licensing require-
ments for contractors 82 or requirement of license bonds. The bonds
would inure to the benefit of the State, which would make disburse-
ments among claimants, or to the benefit of those who might be
injured by the contractor's misconduct. 3 Since a contractor's financial
condition may change radically after the issuance of a license, require-
meit of a higher degree of financial responsibility among license
applicants would offer little assurance that the contractor would not
get into difficulties by, for example, taking on a job which he was not
equipped to handle. License bonds offer only limited protection and
are very expensive. 4 They also lead to enforcement headaches. 85
ELIMINATION OR LIMITATION OF LEINS
From the homeowner's point of view, the most logical, direct, and
conclusive solution would be the outright abolition of mechanics' liens,
or at least their limitation to the amount still owed by the owner to
the contractor at the time the lien is filed. At first blush, this may seem
a rather radical suggestion. Mechanics' liens have been part of the
California statutes for so long that the propriety of their retention is
seldom questioned.80 But one might inquire whether current circum-
stances justify the retention of the mechanics' lien laws. The origin
of these liens is somewhat obscure. There is some evidence that they
8 1 CAr.. PEN. CODE § 506, which makes it embezzlement for a contractor to divert
funds, was held unconstitutional as applied to contractors in People v. Holder, 53 Cal.
App. 45, 199 Pac. 832 (1921). The court held that any legislation which makes it a
crime for one to use his own money for any purpose other than the payment of his debts
violates CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 15, prohibiting imprisonment for debt except in case of
fraud. The court went on to say that if the statute purported to mean that the con-
tractor, notwithstanding the provisions of his contract, holds the money in trust for
others, it would be an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process, and
would violate CAr.. CONSr. art. I, § 1 (freedom to contract with respect to property).
The court also stated that "there can be nothing so injurious to the public welfare in the
failure of a debtor to pay his just debts as to require an exercise of the police power."
53 Cal. App. at 53, 199 Pac. at 836.
8 2 "[I]t is easier for a man to become a licensed contractor [in California] from
the standpoint of financial responsibility than it is for him to buy a washing machine on
time from Sears and Roebuck." FnTH PioGREss REPORT 77 (remarks of Assemblyman
Richard Hanna).
83 See note 34 supra.
84 The premium on a license bond is at least five per cent. Interview With Mr. Lee
Cutler of Marsh and McLennan, Brokers, in San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
85 At present, the Division of Labor Law Enforcement requires license bonds of all
those engaged in the logging industry. The Division must correspond with each licensee
to make sure his bond is renewed annually. The administrative problems are consider-
able, even for this relatively small group of licensees. Interview With Mr. William E.
Fleck, Supervising Deputy Labor Commissioner, in San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1964.
86 The writer has found only two printed statements favoring their abolition.
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were conceived with the chief purpose of aiding the laborer.87 Their
very name tends to buttress this conclusion; "mechanic" is the older
term for laborer or artisan.88 At the time of inception of these liens,
men s consciences were beginning to stir at the plight of the laboring
man. Mechanics' liens were conceived as a harmless method of secur-
ing the laborers' wages. There is strong evidence, however, that
mechanics' liens are nearly obsolete as a wage-security device and
are, by and large, no longer needed by the laborers.89 In this respect
they may have outlived their usefulness.
The contractor, of course, has an unassailable moral right to assert
a lien against the property he has built if he is not paid in full by the
owner. Yet there is no need to give him a statutory lien, as he is in a
position to exact lien rights from the owner by contract.
The subcontractor or materialman is in a somewhat different posi-
tion. Usually not in privity of contract with the owner, he may obtain
a lien only by operation of law. Therefore, if he is to retain any secu-
rity interest in the goods 'he sells or in the products of his labor, he
must be given a statutory lien. The question, then, is whether he should
be entitled to such a security interest.
Bdsis of the Materialman's Claim to Lien Rights
Let us consider first the materialman. When he sells to someone
building a home or other structure for himself or for resale, the mate-
rialman functions as a retailer. He is able to obtain a lien by contract.
This puts him on a parity with other retailers who can retain a security
interest, usually in the form of a conditional sales contract, in the
merchandise they sell on credit. However, when the materialman sells
to someone acting as a contractor or subcontractor, he functions as
a wholesaler. An ordinary wholesaler is unable to retain any security
interest in the merchandise he sells to a retailer which cannot be cut
off by resale to a "buyer in ordinary course of business."90 Therefore,
wholesalers normally extend credit only to retailers who are good risks
or who can put up security apart from the goods sold. Since the lien
laws permit-indeed, encourage-materialmen to extend credit to a
contractor regardless of his credit rating or the absence of nonstatu-
87 See 3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDiNGS OF =u CoNsTIruTIONAL CoNvEENoN or TaE
STATE OF CALronRNA OF 1878-1879 at 1393-94, 1417-18 (1881).
88 Whnsmu, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTioNAnY (2d ed. 1934).
89 See text accompanying notes 36-45 supra.
90" 'Buyer in ordinary course of business' means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security
interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the busi-
ness of selling goods of that kind ...." CAL. CommmcrLCr CODE: § 1201(9) (effective
Jan. 1, 1965). Such a buyer takes free of any defect in the title of a merchant who has
been "entrusted" with the goods, CArL. CosnvmcrAxL CODE § 2403(2), and of a security
interest created by his seller, CAL. ComasRcuAL CODE § 9307.
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tory security, they give materialmen a preferred position over other
classes of wholesalers.
Basis of the Subcontractors Claim to Lien Rights
The subcontractor's claims to lien rights stand on a somewhat surer
footing. Like the laborer, the subcontractor expends his efforts in the
construction of a building; unlike the laborer, he is given no statutory
protection other than the lien laws. There is one notable group given
statutory protection analagous to that afforded the subcontractor. This
group includes repairmen and others who are given possessory liens
on personal property which they repair or store.91 The analogy between
the two groups is sufficiently well-drawn to state that mechanics' liens
are necessary to put subcontractors on a parity with those entitled to
possessory liens-at least to the extent that the mechanics' liens are
limited to the amount owed by the owner to the contractor. In the
case of mechanics' liens not so limited, the analogy, as we shall see,
breaks down.
Limitation of Liens
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the justification for mecha-
nics' liens is questionable at best (with the possible exception of sub-
contractors' liens). There is, however, no good argument against the
retention of limited liens (limited to the amount found due and owing
from the owner to the contractor at the time the liens are flied). 92
These limited liens can do little harm. They afford the lienors some
protection against a defaulting homeowner and do not oblige them to
rely on the contractor to secure their claims by enforcing his own lien.
The owner cannot complain if he is forced to discharge fully the
obligations of his contract or lose his property, so long as he is not
required to pay more than the contract price. Indeed, no one can
complain, except the owner's general creditors.
Unlimited liens are quite another matter. In considering the pro-
priety of unlimited liens, the basic question is whether the owner
91 CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 3051-66.
92 There are two basic types of mechanics' liens systems in the United States.
Under the so-called "New York system," the liens are derivative-i.e., the lienors are
substituted to the rights of the contractor. Under this system, the liens are necessarily
limited to the amount which the owner owes the contractor. Under the so-called "Penn-
sylvania system," the liens are direct liens and, as in California, need not be limited.
36 Am. Jur. Mechanics Liens § 6 (1938); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens §§ 105-06 (1955).
A variant of the "New York system" would give a lien to the contractor only and
require others to use stop notices, which require the owner to withhold funds remaining
in his possession. If such a plan were adopted in California, it would be advisable to
revise CALr. CODE Cirv. PRoc. § 1190.1(h), which renders stop notices ineffective against
a third party (e.g., a lender) holding the funds unless the person giving notice furnishes
the holder of the funds a bond in the penal sum of 125% of the amount sought to be
garnished.
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should be made the involuntary guarantor of the fulfillment of another's
contract with a third party. When an owner in good faith pays the
contractor in full, the contractor diverts the funds, and the unpaid
claimants assert liens against the property, there are two sides with
legitimate competing interests. The lienors claim the right to be
compensated for the goods and services they have furnished the pro-
ject, from which the owner has benefited. The owner claims the right
not to have to pay more than once for the benefit he has received.
In balancing these claims certain factors weigh against the lienors.
The liens give the lienors a preferred position not given to other classes
of laborers and businessmen. Even the analogy between the subcon-
tractor and the repairman breaks down in the case of unlimited liens.
The possessory lien on chattels does not usually impose "double pay-
ment" on the owner, as there is normally contractual privity between
the owner and the repairman. Also, the presumption that every man
knows the law is probably well founded in the case of the subcon-
tractor and materialmen. Knowing his rights under the lien laws, he
does not bother to get security from the contractor. In some cases
he may cynically extend credit to a contractor whom he knows to be
financially irresponsible, relying on his lien rights against the unsus-
pecting homeowner. The owner, on the other hand, though technically
chargeable with knowledge of the law, cannot in fact be expected
to be aware of the dangers confronting him and to guard against
themP8
What can be said in favor of unlimited mechanics' liens? It is
undoubtedly true that they "grease the wheels" of the construction
industry by permitting contractors to operate who could not otherwise
get credit." In many cases this bbnefits the owner. But the price
which the owner must pay when a job "goes sour" is so great that it
is doubtful that any owner who truly understood the risks involved
would take the chance.
Constitutional Basis
The record of the constitutional convention of 1878 as it relates to
mechanics' liens 5 may shed some light on the intention of the dele-
gates when they inserted the lien provision into the constitution. The
delegates participating in the debate were obviously aware of the
fact that an earlier decision96 had construed mechanics' liens as limited
to the amount found due and owing to the contractor. The drafting
93 See note 11 supra.
94 Hearing of the Senate Interim Judiciary Committee, at the Courthouse, Santa
Barbara, California 156, Aug. 20-21, 1956 [hereinafter cited as Santa Barbara Hearing].
95 3 DEBATES AND PRoCED INGs OF THE CoNSTrruTnoNAL CONVENTnON OF THE
STATE OF CArmwofNfA OF 1878-1879 at 1393-94, 1417-18 (1881).
96 Renton v. Conley, 49 Cal. 185 (1874).
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committee reported out the provision in the form in which it was
ultimately enacted.
97
A Mr. Barbour introduced an amended version which would have
made the liens unlimited and would also have made the owner per-
sonally liable for them. 8 There was some talk of revising the offered
amendment to eliminate the feature of personal liability while retain-
ing unlimited lien liabiliiy. Such a revision was never made, so the
delegates never had the opportunity to vote on the simple issue of
limited versus unlimited liens. The proponents of the Barbour amend-
ment indicated that their primary interest was in aiding the laborer;
materialmen were included as potential lienors without any real reason
for including them advanced. 9 No one contended that it was proper
that an innocent homeowner should be subjected to "double payment."
Instead, the proponents of the amendment assumed that the honest
owner would be fully aware of the law and be able to protect him-
self.100 The principal argument in support of the Barbour amendment
was that it would prevent "collusion" between "thieving contractors
and scoundrelly owners who connive to swindle the workman out of
his wages."' 0' It seems that there had been at least one instance where
an owner and contractor negotiated an undervalued contract. The
actual construction cost exceeded the contract price by some sixty per
cent; the workmen and materialmen were able to collect from the
contractor only the amount of the contract price and stood a loss as
to the balance. This would be a sound argument in favor of unlimited
liens if there were any evidence that such alleged "collusion" took
place with any frequency. But it would seem that no contractor, honest
or otherwise, would negotiate such a contract, as he would remain
liable personally for the claims of the lienors, and this liability would
wipe out any profit he might make by virtue of a secret deal with an
unscrupulous owner. The opponents of the amendment used some
rather strong language in asserting their position. One called the
amendment a "fraud" and "infirm in principle." 0 2 At all events, the
amendment was voted down. Since most of the speakers seemed to
be of the opinion that unlimited liens would not be permitted under
the constitution unless expressly authorized therein,103 the fact that
97 "Mechanics, materialmen, artisans, and laborers of every class, shall have a lien
upon the property upon which they have bestowed labor or furnished material for the
value of such labor done and material furnished; and the Legislature shall provide, by
law, for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens." CAL. CONSr. art. XX, § 15.
983 DEBAT.S A PRocEEnlNos OF THE CoNsrurboNAL CoNvENTon OF T
STATE OF CALoRNu OF 1878-1879 at 1393 (1881).
99 Id. at 1394.
100 Id. at 1417.
101 Id. at 1394.
102 Id. at 1417.
103 Id. at 1393-94, 1417-18.
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the Barbour amendment was defeated would seem to indicate an
intention on the part of the delegates that unlimited liens should not
be allowed. This cannot be stated with certainty, however, since one
of the delegates was of the opinion that the provision as ultimately
enacted would leave the question of limited or unlimited liens up to
the legislature. 0 4 Thus, there remains the possibility that the delegates
adopted his view, and decided to dump the question into the legislators'
laps. It can be stated categorically that, since no one thought that
innocent homeowners should be subjected to "double payment," the
delegates did not give their stamp of approval in advance to the pres-
ent scheme of mechanics' liens.
Conclusions on Elimination or Limitation
From the foregoing it will be seen that although subcontractors and
materialmen can present legitimate claims to unlimited lien rights, it
would seem that they are outweighed by the claims of the owners to
protection from "double payment." As a matter of abstract justice,
the laborers' liens are just as hard to justify. They give the construction
worker a measure of protection not accorded to laborers in other
fields. Yet this is all right if there is anything unique about the con-
struction industry which would justify such a preference.10 5 Assuming
that there is, however, it does not necessarily follow that protection
can best be afforded by unlimited mechanics' liens. Enforcement of
these liens is time-consuming and difficult at best-ineffectual at worst.
A better plan might be to require each contractor to obtain a rider to
his workmen's compensation insurance policy which would insure his
employees against loss of wages. This plan might have some objec-
tionable features, and no investigation has been made into its feasi-
bility. But if wage losses are the fault of the contractors, they should
be compensated for by the contractors and not by the individual home-
owners.
Despite all the arguments against unlimited mechanics' liens, limi-
tation would not be indicated if there were any other acceptable means
of doing justice to the homeowner. But there is not. None of the solu-
tions considered in this comment, singly or in combination, would
protect the homeowner in all cases. Consequently, limitation of liens
to the amount which the owner owes the contractor seems to be the
104 Id. at 1417.
105 Such a unique feature has been suggested to be the fact that contractors have
a significantly higher rate of business failures than other businessmen, and so subject
their employees to an unusual risk of wage loss. The writer has not been able to find
any evidence to support or refute this proposition. Assuming that it is true, it could well
be the result of mechanics' liens, rather than a reason for their continuation. It has been
asserted that the present mechanics' liens scheme has encouraged financially irrespon-
sible persons to enter the contracting field by affording them easy credit. See Santa-
Barbara Hearing 25, 156.
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only way to afford the homeowner complete protection. It is therefore
recommended. However, there is no real hope that mechanics' liens can
be limited. Any attempt to restrict these liens would be violently op-
posed by those who now benefit from the liens,106 and would be sup-
ported only by the few interested persons who have no axe to grind.
The homeowners would be represented only in spirit, since they are
largely ignorant of the present state of the law. It is perhaps too much
to expect any legislature to enact a measure in the face of violent,
organized opposition and little or no support, merely because it is the
right thing to do. Therefore, it would be wise to consider a compromise
solution.
Measures Aimed at Education or Notification of the Owner
Several types of "notice bills" have been proposed. They all assume
that the homeowner lacks factual or legal knowledge and would be
able to protect himself if properly enlightened. The so-called "Five-
Day Notice Bill" would require potential lienors to notify contractor
and owner of their contributions as a condition precedent to the valid-
ity of their liens. One variation of this has been adopted by the legis-
lature. 07 This bill would aid the honest contractor by informing him
of unsuspected claims by those with whom he is not in privity. But
it offers little aid to the homeowner, as the notices may carry no hint
of their legal consequences, and even if they did, they would arrive too
late for the homeowner to exact a bond that would give him statutory
protection. 0  Another "notice bill" 09 would require t officer issuing
a building permit to notify the owner that he may have to satisfy
mechanics' liens out of his own pocket or lose his property, inform him
how he may protect himself, and advise him to seek professional ad-
vice. Since the contract would be signed before the notice arrived,
the bill, to be fully effective, would have to permit the owner to avoid
the contract within a specified period if the contractor could not or
would not obtain a bond. The merit of this plan depends upon what
one considers to be the real problem. Is the real problem that the
homeowner may be subjected to "double payment"? Or is it that it
is unfair for him to be subjected to "double payment because he is
not aware of the law? If the unfairness of expecting the homeowner
to be cognizant of an obscure law is recognized as the main evil, the
bill is the answer. But it is questionable how many homeowners would
pay attention to the notice and act upon it. Therefore, it may not be
very effective in preventing actual losses. The question is one of social
100 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
107 CAL. CODE Cry. Pnoc. § 1193. The notice must be given by personal service
or registered or certified mail no later than fifteen days prior to the expiration of the
period for filing liens.
108 CAL. CODE Cxv. FROC. § 1185.1.
109 F m PnocPEss REPoRT 116.
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policy-how far should we go to protect a person from his own igno-
rance and carelessness? Additionally, the bill would protect the lienor
only to the extent that the owner saw fit to protect himself. If the
owner did not bother to require the bond, the lienor would be left
where he is today.
Still another "notice bill" 10 would require the contractor to notify
the owner and lender of persons contributing to the work of improve-
ment and to furnish the owner and lender with certified labor and
material releases before being paid. The plan seems sound, but there
is an enormous practical difficulty, particularly on large jobs, in ascer-
taining the identities of all laborers who worked on the project and
obtaining releases from all of them. Anything less would not offer full
protection.
Plans Requiring Enforcement by Private Individuals or Agencies
Another group of plans would condition the priority of the lender's
trust deed on the contractor's furnishing adequate protection to lienors
and owners, by bond or otherwise. One measure which has reached the
legislature"' would make the lender's encumbrance prior to mechanics'
liens only if the contractor obtained a Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1185.1 bond. Since a lender will rarely make a loan unless he is
reasonably sure of the priority of his trust deed, this is really a compul-
sory bonding bill applicable only to construction financed by someone
other than the owner. It is open to the same general objections as the
other compulsory bonding bills.
A plan advanced by Mr. Glen Behymer of the Los Angeles Bar"
would make the lender's deed prior if a proper bond were firnished or
if the owner, by terms in his contract, retained twenty-five per cent
of the contract price until the period for filing mechanics' liens expired.
This plan is much better and has a great deal of merit.-" But it would
not afford protection where the contractor diverts funds from one or
more of his earlier progress payments and then disappears or goes
bankrupt, leaving unpaid claimants. Conceivably, on small jobs, the
contractor might divert all or nearly all of his progress payments and
abandon or complete the job leaving lien claims for up to seventy-five
per cent of the value of the project. The amount retained in the hands
of the owner would not satisfy these liens, the trust deed would have
priority, and the liens would wipe out any interest the owner might
have in the property, which would probably be insufficient to satisfy all
of the lien claims. In the absence of evidence as to how often this
110 THruD PROGBESS REPORT 77.
111 A.B. 2440, 1957, in TnmD PROGRESS REPORT 80.
112 Id. at 82.
"Is This is not an outright compulsory bonding bill. It would allow a solvent but
uxbondable contractor to function.
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sort of thing happens, no satisfactory evaluation of the plan's probable
effectiveness can be made.
THE ECLECTIC PLAN
Although none of the above proposals by itself seems to offer a
satisfactory solution, a selection of some of the best features of several
leads to an apparently adequate solution which might not be too offen-
sive to those now entitled to unlimited liens. This solution, the eclectic
plan, is presented in the following paragraphs.
The plan would condition the priority of the lender's trust deed on
the contractor's furnishing a section 1185.1 bond or other ironclad
protection for lienors and owner.114 The first step would be to provide
that all persons who may wish to file liens (except laborers) must, as a
condition of the validity of their liens, notify the contractor and owner
(or money-lender, if there is one) that they have contracted to con-
tribute to the work of improvement no later than ten days after having
entered into such a contract. The notice would have to contain the
names of the contracting parties and a general description of the
labor or materials to be furnished. Section 1193 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which requires lienors (except laborers) to notify owner
and contractor of their contributions within fifteen days prior to filing
liens, could be amended so to provide.
Section 1188.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with
priorities, would then be amended to provide that mechanics' liens
would be prior to lenders' trust deeds unless the contractor, owner,
and lender entered into a specified binding agreement. The agreement
would have to provide that the loan proceeds, together with the
amount which the owner is contributing, should be placed with the
lender and held as a trust fund 15 for the benefit of lose entitled to
1 1 4 CAL. CODE CIrv. Pnoc. § 1189.1 uses such a plan with respect to site-improve-
ment liens (liens provided for by CAL. CODE, Civ. Fhoc. § 1184.1). Section 1189.1
permits the trust deed to be prior to mechanics' liens only if a proper bond is furnished
or if the loan proceeds are placed with the lender under an agreement that they will not
be paid out, except in satisfaction of lien claims, until the expiration of the period for
filing liens. This apparently works well in the case of site-improvements, which are
relatively inexpensive and quick jobs. It would not be satisfactory if applied to general
construction, however, as it makes no allowance for the customary (and necessary)
practice of paying the construction funds out in installments.
115 See S.B. 2194, 1957, in SENATE INTERim JuDIcraAY CoindrrrEE, 1955-1957,
FouRTH PRoGREss REPORT TO mTE LEGISLATUnE 264-67. This bill would condition
priority of the trust deed on the filing of a bond or the placing of the loan proceeds in
trust with the lender under an agreement that the fund could not be paid out or as-
signed until valid lien claims or notices to withhold were satisfied. The chief difficulty
with this bill, apart from its virtual incomprehensibility, is that it (apparently) would
permit the loan proceeds to be completely disbursed before the filing of liens or notices
to withhold.
November, 1964] COMMENTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
liens." 6 At least twenty-five per cent of the amount of the fund (i.e.,
the amount of the contract price) would have to be retained by the
lender until the expiration of the period for filing mechanics' liens
(other than contractors' liens),1 7 In addition, the lender would not
be permitted to pay out any of the fund in the form of progress pay-
ments until he had received waivers of lien rights accrued as of the
date the progress payment was due from those who had fied notices
pursuant to section 1193. The contractor could obtain such waivers
any way he chose. At least three methods suggest themselves: paying
the claimants off in cash, convincing them of the contractor's good
credit, or making assignments of the contractor's interest in the prog-
ress payments. The statute would have to determine the relative
priorities of such assignments and assignments made for other pur-
poses. The amount retained would normally be ample for the
satisfaction of lien claims of laborers as well as those of persons who
file claims for work done or materials furnished subsequent to the final
progress payment.1 8 The plan would thus protect the homeowner from
lien claims he could not satisfy. It would also protect subcontractors
and materialmen unless they were foolish enough to waive their lien
rights without adequate consideration. Laborers would be protected
by the twenty-five per cent retention." 9
There are at least two disadvantages to the plan. The unbondable
contractor who lacked sufficient cash or credit to tide him over until
he could receive the twenty-five per cent retention would probably be
forced out of business, or at least out of general contracting. But since
such contractors are likely to be the ones who present the greatest
116 The lender would be performing a function presently performed on many jobs
by the so-called "joint control industry." See Comment, 16 HASTINGs L.J. 229 (1964).
17 This is normally thirty days. See CAr.. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1193.1.
118 It is not certain that such claims would usually aggregate less than twenty-five
per cent of the contract price. On the other hand, it has been asserted that even the
twenty per cent retention under a former law (see note 119 infra) was adequate to
satisfy such claims. TrnmD P.orBEss REPORT 82.
119 The plan bears some resemblance to the laws in force from 1885 to 1911. Under
these laws contracts which were invalid left the property subject to unlimited mechanics'
liens. A valid contract had to provide that the contract price was payable in installments
at specified times, with at least twenty-five per cent payable not less than thirty-five days
after completion. All contracts for more than $1,000 had to be in writing, filed, and
recorded before commencement of work. It was said in Roystone Co. v. Darling, 171
Cal. 526, 154 Pac. 15 (1915), that these laws did not work well in practical opera-
tion. Disputes often arose over terms of contracts, time of maturity of installments, mak-
ing of payments, time of beginning work with respect to filing of the contract for
record, and other details. The eclectic plan would not seem to be open to the same
objections. Disputes would normally not arise as to the validity of the contract since,
even if the contract did not conform exactly to the statutory requirements, few claims
of lien would arise if the lender in fact acted in good faith to protect lienors.
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danger to lienors and owners, their departure could hardly be
mourned.
The more serious disadvantage of the contract alternative is the
work involved in meeting the terms of the requisite contract. The
amount of paper work required to obtain waivers of lien rights would
be great. Subcontractors, materialmen, contractors, and lenders would
all be put to a great deal of bother. But this can be justified by the fact
that each of them (except the contractor) holds a preferred position
and can justly be called upon to make sacrifices for the protection of
others in order to maintain his preferred position. For example, lienors
are presently favored at the expense of the homeowner, and the lender
is favored at the expense of lienors. The contractor does not hold a pre-
ferred position, except against the general creditors of a defaulting
homeowner, but he is in a position to cause grave financial loss to
others and so must be subject to some regulation. And the lienor or
lender who wished to avoid all this bother would be free to do so-if
he wanted to give up his preferred position. The lienor could simply
fail to send the requisite notice, and the lender could take his chances
with respect to priorities.
The advantages of the eclectic plan are numerous. The home-
owner, of course, would be given substantial, if not complete pro-
tection. The lien claimant would have more security than he now
enjoys. Even the lender would receive some benefit, as he would
be able to remove any uncertainty as to his priority. 20 No govern-
mental agency other than the courts would be concerned with the
enforcement of the plan.121 The lender would be made the police-
man, required at his peril to insure that others were protected.
In practice the plan would probably result in compulsory bonding
of all bondable contractors-compulsory bonding with a safety valve
alternative that would insure against disastrous social and economic
consequences. The contractor would have an incentive to get a bond,
where presently he has none, both to avoid the bother of obtaining
waivers and to escape the necessity for the twenty-five per cent reten-
tion. The lender, seeking to avoid any extra work, would no doubt
insist on a bond wherever he could. But the lender is also anxious
to make as many loans as possible. If 'he found enough bondable con-
12oAt present the lender is not always able to be certain, before recording his
trust deed, that work has actually not been commenced. If work has begun, a lender's
trust deed subsequently recorded will be junior to mechanics' liens. Sax v. Clark, 180
Cal. 287, 180 Pac. 821 (1919); Wasco Creamery & Constr. Co. v. Coffee, 117 Cal.
App. 298, 3 P.2d 588 (1931).
12 1 The courts would come into the picture only if an unpaid lienor contested the
lender's priority or sued the lender for breach of the third party beneficiary contract.
Neither of these would occur if the lender acted in good faith to protect the lienors.
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tractors to enable him to make maximum use of his funds, he would
require a bond in every case. Otherwise he would make loans under
the trust fund plan. The dangers attendant upon other compulsory
bonding plans would thus be averted.m
The plan is not complete. It would not protect anyone in cases
where the construction was financed by the owner out of his cash
reserves or out of the proceeds of a loan not secured by an encum-
brance on the property. Where the work consisted of a small alteration
job, however, the losses sustained would not be great. And in those
relatively rare instances where the owner has the cash or credit to
finance the construction of an entire home or other building, he is
more likely to be aware of the desirability of consulting a lawyer in
order to protect himself.
The suggested statute would cover speculative builders by de-
fining them as contractors and their buyers as owners. It should not
work a great hardship on large, honest tract developers, however.
Should they consider bonding an unnecessary precaution, they would
probably be in a position to demand waivers of lien rights on the
part of all who contribute to the job before work begins. If the
developer's credit is unquestioned, such demands would be readily
honored; otherwise, he should be required to submit himself to
measures which are necessary for the protection of others. If the
proposal led to some successful, mild intimidation by contractors to
obtain waivers, the "intimidatees" would only be giving up rights not
enjoyed by other classes of businessmen, and they would still be doing
so voluntarily.
Suggested statutory amendments are set out in the Appendix. Any
proposal to enact these or similar statutes would face rough going.
Strong objections could be expected from those who would be ad-
versely affected-particularly the lenders, who do not want to have
their priorities conditioned on anything. But it is submitted that in
considering such statutes, the legislators should give primary con-
sideration to the needs of the "forgotten man" of mechanics' lien
laws-the homeowner-and act accordingly.
APPENDIX-SUGGESTED STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
Present Code Amended Code
CAnIrORMA CODE OF CIVuL PROCEDURE, CALIFORN_ CODE OF Civm PsiocEnurE,
§ 1193(a). Written notice; persons re- § 1193(a). Written notice; persons re-
quired to give; contents. Except one quired to give; contents. Except one
under direct contract with the owner or under direct contract with the owner or
one performing actual labor for wages, one performing actual labor for wages,
122One objection to compulsory bonding, however, would not be overcome. It




every person who furnishes labor, service,
equipment or material for which a lien
otherwise can be claimed under this
chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite
to the validity of any claim of lien subse-
quently filed, cause to be given not later
than 15 days prior to the filing of a claim
of lien a written notice as prescribed by
this section, to the owner or reputed
owner and to the original contractor. The
notice shall contain a general description
of the labor, service, equipment or ma-
terials furnished, the name and address of
such person furnishing such labor, services,
equipment or materials, and the name'of
the person who contracted for purchase of
such labor, services, equipment or ma-
terials. If an invoice for such materials
contains this information, a copy of such
invoice, transmitted in the manner pre-
scribed by this section, shall be sufficient
notice. The notice may be sent at any
time after any labor, services, equipment
or materials are furnished, but in no event
later than fifteen (15) days prior to the
expiration of the time within which to
file a claim of lien.
CMALWORNU CODE OF Civm PRocEDuRE,
§ 1188.1. Preferences. The liens provided
for in this chapter, except as otherwise in
this article provided, are preferred to any
Amended Code
every person who furnishes labor, service,
equipment or material for which a lien
otherwise can be claimed under this
chapter must, as a necessary prerequisite
to the validity of any claim of lien sub-
sequently filed, cause to be given not later
than 10 days after such person has en-
tered into a contractual agreement to
contribute to a work of improvement,123 a
written notice as prescribed by this sec-
tion, to the owner or reputed owner and
to the original contractor. If the owner
has designated any lender, as defined in
Section 1188.1 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, or any surety as his agent to re-
ceive the notices provided for by this
section, such notices must be given to
such agent, rather than to the owner. Such
designation may be made known upon the
face of the building permit, or by notice
attached to the building permit, but any
person required to file notices under this
section shall be charged with knowledge
of such designation if he in fact receives
such knowledge by any means.'2 4 The
notice shall contain a general description
of the labor, service, equipment or ma-
terials to be furnished, the name and ad-
dress of such person furnishing such labor,
services, equipment or materials, and the
name of the person who contracted for
purchase of such labor, services, equip-
ment or materials. If an invoice for such
materials contains this information, a copy
of such invoice, transmitted in the manner
prescribed by this section, shall be suf-
ficient notice.
CAIr oNA CODE OF CrVIL ,PocEDurE,
§ 1188.1. Preferences. (a) Definitions.
For the purposes of this section, the term
contractor shall include any person who
123 This change in the statute would no doubt cause some hardship to lien
claimants. Though they are at present required to give a similar notice, they need not
do so until fifteen days prior to the expiration of the period for filing liens. Thus, they
presumably wait until the last minute and give notice only if they have not yet been
paid. Under this amendment they would be obliged to give notice promptly after
entering into a contract to contribute to the improvement unless they were satisfied with
the contractor's unsecured credit.
124 This is designed to encourage contractors to pass word down to the other
claimants as to whom to notify. If in doubt, the claimants could verify the contractor's
word by a telephone call to the lender, without the necessity of checking the building
permit.
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Present Code
lien, mortgage, deed of trust, or other en-
cumbrance upon the premises and im-
provements to which the liens provided
for in this chapter attach which may have
attached subsequent to the time when the
building, improvement, structure, or work
of improvement in connection with which
the lien claimant has done his work or
fumished his material was commenced;
also to any lien, mortgage, deed of trust,
or other encumbrance of which the lien
claimant had no notice and which was
unrecorded at the time the building, im-
provement, structure, or work of improve.
ment on which such lien claimant has
done his work or for which he has fur-
nished his material, appliances or power
was commenced.
A mortgage or deed of trust which
would be prior to any of the liens pro-
vided for in this chapter to the extent
of obligatory advances made thereunder in
accordance with the commitment of the
lender shall also be prior to the liens pro-
vide& for in this chapter as to any other
advances, secured by such mortgage or
deed of trust, which are used in payment
of any claim of lien as provided for in
this chapter, if any, which is recorded at
the date or dates of such other advances
and thereafter in the payment of all or
any part of the costs of any work of im-
provement on the property which is sub-
ject to such mortgage or deed of trust;
provided, that the priority of such mort-
gage or deed of trust shall not exceed in
total for both obligatory advances made
in accordance with the commitment of the
lender and other advances the amount of
the original obligatory commitment of the
lender as shown in said mortgage or deed
of trust.
Amended Code
contracts directly with an owner for im-
provement of real property in which the
owner has an interest, and any person
who contracts, through an agent or other-
wise, with an owner to improve real prop-
erty and to convey a freehold interest in
the same to the owner upon completion
of such improvement.12 5
The term owner shall include any per-
son who has an interest in real property
and who contracts with a contractor for
the improvement of real property, and any
person who contracts to purchase any free-
hold interest in any unfinished structure,
and/or the land thereunder, upon the
completion of said structure. Any monetary
consideration in excess of $100 given by
an owner for such contract of sale shall
be deemed to be a "sum to be contributed
by the owner to the work of improvement"
within the meaning of subdivision (b) of
this section. 12 6
The term lender shall include any per-
son, corporation, association, partnership,
or 6ther organization which shall make
any loan for the purpose of financing any
work of improvement upon real prop-
erty, as consideration for which the lender
receives a mortgage, deed of trust, or
other encumbrance upon such real prop-
erty or work of improvement as security
for the loan.
(b) The liens provided for in this
chapter, except as otherwise in this article
provided, are preferred to any lien, mort-
gage, deed of trust, or other encumbrance
upon the premises and improvements to
which the liens provided for in this chap-
ter attach which may have attached sub-
sequent to the time when the building,
improvement, structure, or work of iin-
provement in connection with which the
lien claimant has done his work or fur-
nished his material was commenced; also
to any lien, mortgage, deed of trust, or
other encumbrance of which the lien claim-
125 This is designed to cover the. speculative builder who contracts with a buyer to
sell him a lot and building when the building is completed and gets a down payment
before completion. The buyer often loses his down payment if the builder fails.
126 The effect of this provision, read in connection with the remainder of the
statute, would be to require the buyer's down payment to be placed in "escrow" with
the lender. It could not be paid out until all lien claims were satisfied. 'Binders" not
exceeding $100 would be exempt.
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ant had no notice and which was un-
recorded at the time the building,
improvement, structure, or work of im-
provement on which such lien claimant
has done his work or for which he has
furnished his material, appliances or power
was commenced; provided, however that
any mortgage, deed of trust, or other en-
cumbrance held by a lender shall, in all
cases, be preferred to the liens provided
for in this chapter if, and only if, one of
the following is true:
A statutory labor and material bond is
filed. Such bondmust conform to the
requirements of Section 1185.1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as to the pro-
visions of the bond, and must be properly
filed and recorded, along with the con-
tract, as provided by that section; or
A binding contract, containing the
terms hereinafter provided, is executed by
the owner, contractor, and lender. Such
contract must provide that:
The loan proceeds, together with the
sum to be contributed by the owner to
the work of improvement, shall be placed
with the lender as a trust fund for the
benefit of persons entitled to liens by this
chapter.
Not less than twenty-five per cent of
the amount of the trust fund shall be re-
tained by the lender until such time as
the period for filing of liens provided by
this chapter, other than liens of original
contractors, has expired. The sum to be
contributed by the owner shall be deemed
to be included in the amount required to
be retained by the lender, to the extent
that it does not exceed such amount.127
The lender shall not pay out any
amount of the trust fund, as advances or
progress payments or otherwise, until and
unless the contractor shall have furnished
to the lender written waivers of lien rights
from all persons who have given or caused
to be given notices to the owner or lender,
127 At present many contractors are able to convince unwary owners to pay them, in
advance of beginning work, the amount, or some part of it, that the owner himself is
putting up. This provision would stop that by assuring that any money paid the
contractor before the expiration of the lien-filing period comes out of the lender's
pocket. The lender will presumably make no payments until work has progressed
sufficiently so that the payments are not greater than the lender's security interest in
the building.
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pursuant to Section 1193 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Such waivers must waive
all lien rights which have accrued as of
the date on which, by agreement between
the contractor and the lender, such advance
or progress payment is due. Provided,
however, that if any person shall refuse to
waive his lien rights, the lender may, with
the consent of the contractor, withhold
the amount claimed by such person, pend-
ing adjudication or agreement of the par-
ties as to its disposition, and pay the
balance of such advance or progress pay-
ment to the owner or contractor. The
owner must designate the lender as his
agent for the service of notices required
to be given by Section 1193 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, as provided in that
section.
Such contract must inure to the benefit
of persons entitled to the liens provided
for by this chapter, to give such persons
a right of action against any party to the
contract, for damages proximately result-
ing from the failure of that party to adhere
to the terms of the contract.
Any assignments of the contractor's in-
terest in any part of the trust fund made
to persons entitled to file liens, in order to
obtain waivers of lien rights, shall be prior
to any assignments made to other per-
sons.128
The provisions of this section shall not
apply to liens provided for by Section
1184.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
priority of such liens being as provided by
Section 1189.1(b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
128 Statutory regulation of the priority of these assignments is necessary to facilitate
assignments to lienors by assuring the assignee that his assignment will not be
subordinate to one made by the contractor to one of his general creditors.
